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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
F. C« STANGL, III,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BURTON M. TODD, et al.,
Defendants.
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY,

Case No. 14105

Plaintiff,
vs.
BURTON M. TODD, et al.,
Defendants
and Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
F. C. STANGL, III,
Third-Party
Defendant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT F. C. STANGL, III
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, F. C. Stangl, III, brought suit to
foreclose a mechanics lien for construction work performed by him on a proposed high-rise apartment complex
at Second Avenue and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City, Utah,

and defendants Burton M. Todd and E. Keith Lignell
counterclaimed for damages for breach of a construction contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants
on their counterclaim, finding that plaintiff had
breached a contract to build the Canyon Road apartment
complex.

Though the projected complex was never built,

the trial court ruled that the proper measure of damages
was its cost of completion and awarded damages to the
defendants in the amount of $340,877.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court that
(1) vacates the judgment of the trial court in favor
of defendants, (2) holds that there was no enforceable
contract between the parties, and (3) enters judgment
in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $40,876.55 for
the value of work performed by him.

In the alternative,

plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case and directing the trial court to determine damages, if any,
based upon the fair market value of the apartment complex had it been completed.
STATEMENT OF FACT
In early 1972, defendants Burton M. Todd and
E. Keith Lignell, who had previously developed several
apartment house projects in the Salt Lake area (R. 315),
-2-

decided to build an apartment complex at Canyon Road
and Second Avenue in Salt Lake City.

They hired

Ronald L. Molen as their architect and Mr. Molen recommended plaintiff F. C. Stangl, III as an experienced
contractor capable of building the project (R. 3 26).
Plaintiff, defendants and Mr. Molen met in April, 1972
(R. 325) to get acquainted and discuss the project in
general terms, but thereafter plaintiff had very little
involvement in the project until June of 1972.

In the

interim the architect prepared preliminary plans and
elevation sketches indicating the basic size and configuration of a 183-unit apartment project (Ex. 6, 7-D).
In June of 1972, Dr. Todd asked plaintiff to
prepare a cost estimate to submit to a prospective lending institution (R. 367-68).

Plaintiff, using the

preliminary plans (Ex. 74~D), prepared a cost breakdown sheet (Ex. 11-D) itemizing expenses for various
categories of construction components in the project.
He submitted this sheet to Dr. Todd along with a letter
(Ex. 52-P) outlining how the project should be built.
The letter stated:
"As you know, it is impossible to give an
exact bid to construct anything without having
exact plans to correlate the costs to the
object being purchased. However, using the
construction management method, I have been able
to give a prospective owner a preliminary proposal indicating a basic type of construction
project and this together with my initial
participation in the engineering and selection

of specified materials, has enabled me to
build over 100 projects of various types for
various owners and hold 100% to the budget
projected in the preliminary proposal."
(Ex. 52-P)(emphasis added)
The cost shown on the breakdown sheet was $2,359,000.
Several items were added, increasing the total price
to $2,399,222 (Ex. 12-D, R. 312). Dr. Todd used
these figures to obtain permanent financing on the
project in the amount of $2,350,000 (Ex. 20-D).
Because their loan commitment was to expire
by October 15 unless construction had started, defendants urged plaintiff to begin work.

An agreement was

executed by the parties on or about the expiration date.—'
Attached to the agreement were the General Conditions
and the Supplementary General Conditions, a copy of
the July 11 letter (Ex. 52-P), a typed copy of the cost
breakdown sheet (Ex. 12-P), and two blank exhibit pages.
Subparagraph (e) of Section 1.1 of the
contract defined the contract to be:
1.

The agreement of October 15;

2.

The General Conditions, Supplementary
Conditions, and the plans and specifications as developed. 2/

V«rhere is sane confusion in the record as to precisely
when the document was executed. The contract was executed in duplicate; one copy bears the date of October 18 (Ex. 1-P), another copy
bears the date of October 12 (R. 400).
2/ln Article IX the phrase "plans and specifications as
developed" is used again. Here, however, there is added the parenthetical expression "See Article II", suggesting that the plans and
specifications are to be developed according to provisions of
Section 2.2.

Section 2.2 provides:
"The parties hereto agree that Contractor has
prepared the contract price based upon preliminary plans and specifications prepared by
Ronald Molen, AIA. Detailed working drawings
have not yet been finally prepared. Contractor
and Architect shall work together in preparation
of final drawings and with the approval of
Architect and Owner, Contractor shall have the
right to specify materials to be used. The
letter [July 11, Ex. 52-P] attached hereto as
Exhibit "C" with its attached cost breakdown,
sets forth types of materials to be specified
in the final plans and working drawings and
also a cost breakdown of items in the project.
Any deviation from the items specified in the
letter shall cause an adjustment in the price
as set forth on the attachment." (emphasis added)
The second paragraph of Section 2.2 recites that the
parties intend that the contractor shall build both a
twelve-story and a nine-story apartment building, a
commons area, and both a two- and three-level parking
ramp.

The project was to conform to all building codes

and applicable laws and the apartments were to be of
a quality equal to that prevailing in the $150 to $250
per month rental range.

The last sentence of Section

2.2 once again reiterates the plaintiff's right to
specify construction materials.
"Contractor shall, with the approval of
the Architect, choose the specific materials
to be used in construction in accordance with
the attached letter (Exhibit 'C')." (emphasis
added)!/
y The contractor's right to specify materials is reemphasized in Section 2.3:
"The Contractor shall have complete control over
the project and over the subcontractors hired to
work on the project."
-5-

At or about the time the agreement
was executed, plaintiff began work on the project.
The site was cleared, existing structures
were demolished and removed (R. 17), land was excavated (R. 17), footings were poured and much
of the steel re-bar necessary for the foundations
was put in place (R. 18). By December, plaintiff
was ready to pour the large concrete slab
that was to form the foundation of the east tower
of the complex.

On or about December 28, bad

weather set in, making it impossible to complete the
concrete pouring and work stopped on the project
(R* 24-25).

The reasonable value of the work, as

found by the court, was $40,896 (R. 1575).
When construction began, final drawings
had not been prepared.

In early July, Molen's

office began work on the drawings beginning with
one of the parking ramps (R. 946) . Plans for
this ramp were probably completed in late August,
1972 (R. 949). In September, the engineer, Ralph
Wadsworth, also made drawings of different possible
floor structures as part of an analysis to determine the flooring to be used (Ex. 100-D,
R. 1265).

Work on the basic plans, especially those

-6-

for the east tower, progressed throughout September
and October.

A partial set of drawings was completed

on or about November 3 (Ex. 78-D).

The record is not

clear as to the exact status of the plans throughout
October and November.

The evidence indicated that

throughout their preparation there were extensive
revisions and changes being drawn into the plans
(R. 950-1006, Ex. 89, 92, 94-D).

The drawings were

not, however, put into final form, nor were specifications prepared, until February, 1973.
During the drawing of the plans, questions
began to arise about the construction items and materials being included.

Among those items were materials

and details that defendants conceded, and the court
later found, were beyond the scope of the October
agreement.

Although the court labeled these items as

"extras" (Finding No. 5, R. 1574), in no case was a
written change order signed by the defendants nor was
the required 30 percent of the additional cost of any
"extra" paid or even agreed to be paid (Ex. 1-P).
By early January, as bids and estimates were
coming in from subcontractors, it became clear that
the project as drawn by the architect, including those
items later deemed "extras", was going to cost more
than the contract price.

The parties had several meet-

ings during January, 1973, during which defendants
-7-

insisted that plaintiff build the project at the
original contract price, although the plans in existence at that time included a number of items not
included in the plans in existence on October 15,
1972 (R. 419-427).

At one of these meetings, plain-

tiff presented a cost breakdown sheet (Ex. 13-D),
reflecting the bids and estimates he was receiving.
The sheet revealed a cost, excluding any profit for
plaintiff, of approximately $2, 700,000.

This sheet

indicated that it was a "revised estimate for component items as per corrected plans plus modifications"
(Ex. 13-D).

Additions, deletions and changes in the

plans were discussed, but the parties were unable to
resolve their differences.

At these January meetings,

defendants stated that the cost estimates were
unacceptable because defendants did not have additional
funds to commit to the project and that it was imperative that the original contract price of $2*4 million
be maintained (R. 422).
When Mr. Molen completed the final plans and
specifications in February (Ex. 9, 10-D), defendants
solicited bids from various contractors.

Unlike the

estimate prepared by plaintiff in June and attached to
the October 15 agreement, these bid proposals were
based on complete and final plans and specifications
and did not contemplate a construction management project
-8-

where the contractor p a r t i c i p a t e s in the preparation
of plans and s p e c i f i c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s .

Plaintiff

was among those asked to bid (Ex. 14-D).

His bid

was $3.4 m i l l i o n , with a l l other bids being higher
(R. 435, 446).

Since the cost of the p r o j e c t was

g r e a t l y in excess of the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t p r i c e , and
since the plans were s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the
plans as of October 15, 1972, p l a i n t i f f refused to
resume c o n s t r u c t i o n .
On March 21, 1973, a l e t t e r dated March 7,
over the signature of defendants 1 a t t o r n e y , was sent
t o p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f was in d e f a u l t
and demanding t h a t he proceed with construction and
build the p r o j e c t for the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t p r i c e
(Ex. 56-P, R. 30).

A few days l a t e r , p l a i n t i f f

filed

a mechanics l i e n on the property, claiming the value
of the work he performed (Ex. 3-P).

Shortly t h e r e -

a f t e r , s u i t was f i l e d t o foreclose the l i e n .

Defend-

a n t s answered the complaint and counterclaimed, seeking damages for p l a i n t i f f ' s purported breach of the
construction agreement.1/
V Marathon Steel Company, a subcontractor supplying
ironwork on the project, also filed suit against defendants
Burton M. Todd and E. Keith Lignell for the value of the goods
and services which i t delivered to the project. In this action,
plaintiff was joined as a third-party defendant. The two cases
were consolidated (R. 1859). Prior to t r i a l , Marathon Steel
Gompany was dismissed as a party. Joined as a party defendant
in the original lien foreclosure suit was Pacific Slope Development which was pursuant to stipulation dismissed as a party (R. 1820).
-9-

On the final day of a nearly three week
trial, the trial court ruled from the bench that
plaintiff had breached his contract to build the
Canyon Road project.

The Findings of Fact do not

specify of what the breach consisted nor when it
occurred, other than to say that on or about January
15, 1973, plaintiff refused to perform further work
on the contract (Finding No. 9, R. 1575).

Though the

contemplated project was never completed, the trial
court, again from the bench, awarded damages based
upon the estimated cost of completion.

The court

found a breach of contract in January and found that,
as of January, the cost to complete the project would
have been $2.7 million (Ex. 13-D), less work already
done.

To this figure the court added 10 percent for

the contractor's presumed profit, thereby obtaining a
total cost of completion figure of $2,97 0,450.

From

this figure the original contract price of $2,399,220
was subtracted.

From the resulting figure, $40,876,

representing the value of plaintiff's work, was subtracted along with $189,475 for "extras", consisting
of items which defendants admitted were not part of
the original construction agreement.
sum is the damage award of $340,877.

-10-

The resulting

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PARTIES EVER REACHED AN AGREEMENT SUFFICIENTLY
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED.
A.

The Evidence Is Clear that the Parties

Never Agreed on a Contract Price.
The intent and language of the October agreement are clear:

The parties acknowledged that the

contract price was based upon preliminary plans, that
detailed working drawings were yet to be prepared, and
that the parties expressly assumed the obligation of
working together to prepare final plans and specifications.

The contractor was unambiguously given the

right to specify the construction materials subject
only to the approval of the architect and the defendant
owners.
Section 2.2 specified that the project was to
be built of the "types of construction materials" outlined on the cost breakdown sheet attached to the July
11 letter (Ex. 11-D, Ex. 52-P).

The sheet contains a

list of 66 categories of construction materials. Some,
like ornamental iron, are quite specific; most, such as
painting and plumbing, are very general.

In accordance

with the items listed on the sheet, the October 15
-11-

agreement permitted plaintiff to specify the particular construction materials within each of the 66
categories.

Where the category is general, as with

painting, plaintiff would have considerable latitude
in specifying the particular type, grade and quality
of paint.

Where the category is more specific,

plaintiff would have correspondingly less freedom in
picking the specific building material.

Plaintiff

could not eliminate categories of materials or refuse
to include certain items in those categories.

For

example, had plaintiff totally refused to include
security doors or fireplaces, he no doubt would have
been in breach.

Similarly, plaintiff could not

refuse to include any masonry or plumbing in the
structure.
The trial court ruled that on or about
October 15, 1972, the parties were in "substantial
agreement as to all material aspects of the buildings
to be constructed for the fixed price, and plans and
drawings substantially reflecting their agreement had
been prepared" (Finding No. 4, R, 1574) (emphasis added).
The court ruled further that as part of the contract
the parties had later agreed to "certain specified
extras for which plaintiff was to be compensated by
defendants in addition to the agreed [fixed price]
of $2,399,222", and that "the reasonable worth of
-12-

said extras was $189,475" (Finding No. 5, R. 1574)
(emphasis added).
If the court was correct in holding that
defendants had agreed to pay $2,399,222 plus $189,475
or a total of $2,588,697, this fact should be supported in the record.

However, the record is clear

that the defendants never agreed to pay more than
$2/399,222 for the project.

In fact, the record is

clear that the defendants were unwilling and unable
to pay any amounts above the original contract price.
At a luncheon meeting in April of 1972,
Dr. Todd stressed the financial constraints within
which the defendants were working:
"Q. Now, did you have a discussion with
respect to the question of whether or not the
property—correction—project, was to be one
hundred percent financed?
A. Right from the inception I tried to
make this clear to everybody that this would
have to be a one hundred percent financed project.
* * *

Q. (By Mr. Tanner) You have stated that
you had discussed this concept from the beginning. Now, my precise question to you is, at
this lunch which I believe you said was the
first time you had met Mr. Stangl?
A. Yes.
Q. At this lunch, did you say anything
to Mr. Stangl or Mr. Molen about whether this
project had to be a hundred percent financed?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What did you tell them?
-13-

A. I told them we would have to work out
a method of completely financing this project.
We'd do it through a sale lease back on the
land and that it would have to be able to sustain itself to the value of the mortgage that
we were able to obtain.
Q. At that time did you discuss with
them the reason for your requiring that it be
one hundred percent self-sustained?
A. Yes. We mentioned that we actually
had our hands full with the Incline Terrace
project and didn't have any additional funds
to commit to this project.
Q. Did Mr. Stangl make any statement to
you that indicated to you in any form that he
did not understand the implications of your
requirement respecting one hundred percent
financing?
A.

No, he didn't." (R. 329-330)

The defendants obtained financing in the
amount of $2,350,000, and at all times communicated to
plaintiff their concern that the contract price approximate this figure.
"Q. Now, you say about mid-May the [financing] figure was pretty well zeroed in on
this? Now, did you communicate that to Mr. Stangl?
A,

Yes, I did.
*

*

*

,,

.-v.,, ....

Q. And this was a pivotal item of course,
to a hundred percent finance job, wasn't it?
[Objection overruled]
DOCTOR TODD: It was very important. And I
made a point of communicating its importance to
both Mr. Stangl, the contractor, and Mr. Molen,
the architect. I was concerned that we all understand the figure that we were working with so
that we wouldn't have any disputes about it.

-14-

Q. (By Mr. Tanner)
what did you mean?

And by disputes,

A. Well, sometimes these projects tend
to get out of hand. The costs go up. And
I wanted it clearly understood just exactly
how much money there was to work with.
Q.

And so you communicated?

A.

I did.

Q.

On more than one occasion?

A. Yes.
THE COURT:
Mr. Stangl?

Communicated to whom,

DOCTOR TODD:
Mr. Molen.

To both Mr. Stangl and to

THE COURT: All right."

(R. 366-67)

If there was in fact a meeting of the minds,
as required by basic contract law, it must necessarily
have included a contract price.

This contract price

could not have been $2,399,222 because that would
contradict the court's critical holding that the
parties had agreed to certain specified extras for
which plaintiff was to be compensated by defendants
in addition to the agreed [fixed] price of $2,399,222.
Nor could this contract price have been $2,588,697
(the fixed price plus the "specified extras") because
defendants, by their own admissions, were unable and
unwilling to pay more than $2,399,222.

Dr. Todd

testified that at the time of the January meeting he
"thought everything was tied down" (R. 421-22), and
-15-

t h a t a t a subsequent meeting a few days l a t e r with
Mr. Stangl and Mr. Molen he s t a t e d t o Mr. Molen
t h a t he considered Mr. Stangl obligated to perform
a t the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t p r i c e :

*

"Mr. S t a n g l ' s got a d e f i n i t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
in t h i s regard because we have committed
ourselves on the b a s i s of h i s f i g u r e s .
Wefve got some r e a l problems if we c a n ' t
get these c o s t s in where they were." (R. 423)
(emphasis added)
Dr, Todd t e s t i f i e d t h a t the purpose of t h i s meeting
was to see if the c o s t s could be "realigned or brought
down and brought i n t o focus and brought back to the
figure we had been t a l k i n g about o r i g i n a l l y " (R. 422)
(emphasis added).—'

I t must be remembered t h a t t h i s

" o r i g i n a l " figure was $2,3 99 m i l l i o n , not the $2,589
m i l l i o n t h a t the t r i a l court found defendants were
obligated t o pay a t t h a t time.

The inescapable con-

clusion must be t h a t t h e r e was no agreement as t o
price.
Obviously the c o u r t ' s theory as to the
" c e r t a i n specified e x t r a s " c o n f l i c t s with defendants'
c o u n s e l ' s theory in March of 1973.

At t h a t time,

V In response to a question concerning why the
defendants did not proceed with the project, Dr. Todd answered:
"Well, there were several reasons. Number one, we
didn't have the additional money to build i t . And

:

on t h e b a s i s of the r e n t a l projections which had
been made, and which we f e l t were maximum, i t wDuld
have been uneconomical t o expend a g r e a t e r sum on i t .
I t would have been an i n v i t a t i o n t o economic d i s a s t e r . "
(R. 431)
-16-

some seven weeks after it became clear the parties
did not have a meeting of the minds, he wrote to
plaintiff stating:
". . . This contract [of October 1972], when
taken together with your letter of July 11,
1972, and the many conferences and conversations between you, Dr« Todd and the architects,
appears to be sufficiently clear and certain
to be performed and enforced.
I am advised that you began construction
under the agreement and have subsequently
ceased construction and informed Drs. Todd and
Lignell that you will not perform the contract
for the price contained therein.
Please consider this letter a demand that
you immediately recommence performance of said
contract, . . . and perform the construction
in full compliance with the terms of the contract and its associated documents and for the
price set forth therein,11 (Ex. 56-P) (emphasis
added)
At this time, the only price set forth anywhere was
the price in the construction agreement, $2,399,222.
And Dr. Todd himself testified that the only
"extras" ever discussed were additional bathrooms in
the "B unit" apartments and the laundry and storage
area under the lobby (R. 4 06-9).

These items were

only two of twelve items found to be "agreed upon"
extras by the trial court.
Dr. Todd did testify later in the proceedings,
after plaintiff had pointed out that there were extensive and substantial changes in the plans (R. 560-619),
that many of these changes had come to his attention,

-17-

and that he considered them "extra" to the agreement
(R. 1361).

But there was no testimony that the

parties ever reached an agreement concerning these
"extras" or ever discussed a price for them.

The

costs of these "extras" were in fact "credited" to
Mr. Stangl and included as part of the contract
price based upon a valuation of their "reasonable"
worth (Finding No. 5, R. 1574).

This reasonable

worth was established, for the most part, by the
testimony of a third-party expert (R. 1420-1444).
Section 3.1 of the October construction
agreement sets forth specific procedures for including extras in the project.

These require change

orders to be in writing and require 30 percent of
any additional cost to be paid at the time of the
change*

It is clear from the record that these

contract procedures were never invoked.
Indeed the record is clear that the disputes that arose in January concerning the costs of
erecting the apartment complex involved not only the
increased costs that Mr. Stangl had run up against,
but also the substantial extras which defendants
consistently indicated, both at that time and at
trial, they were unwilling to pay for.

In such cir-

cumstances, it was error to rule that there was ever
a contract between the parties.
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They had never

agreed on a price.

See, e.g., Restatement of

Contracts, §§ 19, et seq.; Klimek v. Perisich,
371 P.2d 956 (Ore. 1962).
' ' B.

The Evidence Is Clear that the Parties

Never Agreed About the Construction Materials and
Construction Details for the Canyon Road Apartment
Complex•
In the language of contract law, the situation of the parties in October, 1972, was as follows:
In July, plaintiff made an offer to defendants to build the Canyon Road project for $2,399,222
if he could control the specification of materials
and work with the architect in the preparation of
final plans and specifications.

Defendants, with

minor changes, accepted this offer and the terms of
this understanding were embodied in the October construction agreement.

Thus the parties agreed to

build the project for the contract price, but there
was yet no agreement about what the building should
contain and the agreement of the parties was still
indefinite and uncertain.
As stated in Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d
64, 354 P.2d 1070 (1960):
"In order for a contract to be binding,
it must spell out the obligations of the
parties with sufficient definiteness that it
can be performed." (354 P.2d at 1072) See
also Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368
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P.2d 597 (1962); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12
Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961); Owyhee,
Inc. v, Robbins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2dTi81,
407 P.2d 565 (1965) .
This requirement of certainty has been
stringently enforced in construction contracts.
Professor Williston, in his treatise, puts the point
as follows:
"As a promise may insufficiently specify
the price to be paid, so the consideration
for which the price is to be paid may be left
equally uncertain, and in such a case it is
not usually possible to invoke the standard
of reasonableness in order to give the promise
sufficient definiteness to make it enforceable.
Illustrations of such indefiniteness are as
follows: . . . a promise to erect buildings
where the dimensions and plans are not s p e c i fied, or which refers to plans and specifications as part of a contract though no plans
and specifications are attached." (1 Williston
on Contracts, § 42 at 135-36 (3d Ed. 1957))
(emphasis added)
In Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone, 110 Cal.
Rptr, 675, 35 Cal. App. 3d 396 (1974), the contract
provision in question was:
"ARTICLE 20. COMPLETION OF UNDESIGNED INTERIORS.
The total contract price includes the
sum of $30,040 for the completion of the
interior for portions of the building, approximately 9,610 square feet, for which work,
plans and specifications will, in the future,
be prepared by the architect for the tenants
concerned. The Contractor will furnish all
necessary labor and materials to complete and
finish the said areas generally with the
materials and to the standards fixed in the
plans and specifications presently in existence
for the other areas of the building and specifically may be required by the said tenant's
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architect and willf accordingly, furnish,
construct and install the following items:
. . . ." (35 Cal. App. 3d at 400-01)
Plans and specifications for the interior of the
building were transmitted from the defendant owner
to the plaintiff contractor with the assumption that
the plaintiff would perform the work for the $30,040
price.

Plaintiff refused to perform the work called

for by the plans unless he were paid $14 0,000.

The

owners then ordered him off the job and hired other
contractors to perform the interior work.
The trial court found that the plaintiff
had breached and awarded defendants $84,444 on their
counterclaim.

On appeal, the case was reversed.

The

appellate court found the provisions of Article 20
too indefinite to obligate plaintiff to build the
interior areas. The court was specifically faced
with the issue of "extras". As the court stated:
"Article 20 is also uncertain in other
essential respects. As interpreted by the
court, it obligated the contractor to complete the undesigned area in accordance with
specifications to be provided in the future
by the tenants for the guaranteed maximum
contract price plus the reasonable value of
any 'extra1 work required by the tenants.
However, there was no evidence as to how the
'reasonable value' of the 'extras' was to be
determined, whether it was to be cost plus
or some other basis. Nor was there certainty
as to who was to pay for the 'extras'. The
owners testified it was understood the
tenants would pay for them. However, the
tenants, not being parties to the agreement,
were obviously not bound by any understanding
between the contractor and the owners.
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Insofar as it pertained to so-called
'extras' which may be required by the tenants,
article 20 was in essence nothing more than a
promise to agree in the future. If an
essential element of a promise is reserved for
future agreement of the parties, the promise
does not give rise to a legal obligation until
the further agreement is made." (35 Cal. App.
3d at 408-9.
As the point was made in the Idaho case of
Nave v. McGrane, 19 Idaho 111, 113 P. 82 (1910):
"If the plans and specifications were not
definite and certain as to the kinds and qualities of material to be used, the class of workmanship, etc., the time within which the
building must be completed, the method of making
payments and other matters, the bid to construct
the building would only indicate a willingness
to negotiate further in regard to the matters
not specified, and its acceptance would express
a like willingness, but would not bind either
party." (113 P. at 85) (emphasis added)
In Klimek v. Perisich, 371 P.2d 956 (Ore.
1962), plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
contractor for an alleged breach of a contract to
remodel an old dwelling house into a rooming house.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which
was set aside by the trial court and plaintiff appealed.
The parties orally agreed that the contractor would
perform the work at a cost not to exceed $10,000 with
the understanding that as the required plumbing, heating or electrical wiring became necessary, such items
would be contracted for at the most reasonable price
available.
upon.

No plans or specifications were agreed

The court sustained the trial court's finding
-22-

that the agreement was too indefinite to be enforceable and did so for the following reasons:
"The trial court, in granting judgment
for the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury, based its opinion on the indefiniteness of the subject matter of the offer.
The plaintiff contends that the subject matter
of the offer is sufficiently definite in that
the parties agreed upon a maximum amount to be
paid by the plaintiff for the remodeling of a
certain building; that the extent and requirements for remodeling were certain, although
no specifications were agreed upon; that the
minimum requirements of the building code of
the city of Portland required certain materials
to be used, and this supplied the lack of
specifications as to the work to be done and
the material to be used by the defendant . . *
"The difficulty with plaintiff's contentions that the minimal requirements of the city
building code are sufficiently definite as a
substitute for specifications is that there is
no evidence that the parties agreed that compliance with the minimal requirements of the
building code would constitute a satisfactory
execution of the purported contract, and also
there is no evidence that the building code
specifies the extent of the remodeling, or
the kinds or types of materials that could be
satisfactorily used in the remodeling . . . . "
(371 P.2d at 961) Cf. Halowich v. Amminiti,
190 Pa. Super. 314, 154 A.2d 406 (1959).
In Cannady v. Martin, 98 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex.
App. 1936), the court was faced with the following
contract provision:
"It is further agreed and understood that
said W. I. Cannady and H. E. Cannady agree
themselves to complete a brick building upon
lot 13 in said Block No. 85 with ninety
(90) days from the time they complete the
building for said J. G. Martin and C. M.
Martin, and that the west wall of said
Martin building and the east wall of said
Cannady building shall be a joint wall, and
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that said wall shall be on the common line
of said lots 14 and 13, and shall be half
on each lot, and that said W. I. Cannady and
H. E. Cannady are to pay said J. G. Martin
and C. M. Martin for half of said wall on
completion of the said building for said
J. G. Martin and C. M. Martin."
There was also evidence that there was an oral agreement that the building was to be 25 feet wide by 100
feet long and a modern brick building of the same
character as appellees1 and adapted to the use of
some mercantile establishment.
The court held that the written portion of
the contract was too vague and indefinite to be
enforceable.

(See also Greater Houston Suburban Corp.

v. Dupuy & Mullen, 176 S.W. 668 (Tex. App. 1915); and
Bissenger v. Price, 117 Ala. 480, 23 S. 67 (1898)).
In Colorado Corp. v. Smith, 263 P.2d 79
(Cal. App. 1953), the court was faced with the enforceability of a provision whereby one party had agreed
"to construct at such time as he chooses a residence
of not less than 12 00 square feet" on each of the
parcels of particular property.

The court held this

agreement to be unenforceable for the following
reasons:

>

:

Vi^c;,^--

"Obviously the clause by which the
buyer agreed to construct residences on Gault
Street was an essential term of the contract;
it was part of the consideration to the
Seller for his promise to sell, manifestly to
better secure him in the payment of the purchase price. Apart from the requirement
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that the residences should not be less
than 1200 square feet each, the contract
is incomplete in not specifying how
many residences were to be constructed
and is silent as to the size (except
that each was to be 1200 square feet),
type, location, cost, appearance or anyother details of construction," (253 P„2d
at 81)
In the instant case, the trial court, unable to find an explicit agreement between the
parties about materials and construction details,
erroneously ruled that the parties reached an agreement by finding it in the plans and "specificied
extras".

The court held:

1. That by October 15 the parties were
in "substantial agreement" about what they
wanted in the project (Finding No. 4, R. 1574);
and
2. That plans and specifications "substantially reflecting" this "substantial
agreement" had been prepared by the architect
and had become a part of the agreement
(Finding No. 4, R. 1575; Conclusion No. 1,
R. 1577); and
3. That the plans and specification,
after October 15, included certain "specified"
or "agreed" extras which became part of the
parties1 agreement (Finding No. 5, R. 1574;
Conclusion No. 1, R. 1577).
The record shows, however, that regardless of the
state of completion of the plans in Mr. Molen's office
on October 15, the parties based the construction
agreement upon the preliminary proposal outlined in
Mr. Stangl's July 11 letter.

Moreover, the plans

and specifications were not sufficiently complete on
-2 5-

October 15 to allow the inference that they somehow
embodied the parties1 understanding.

Finally, since

a "substantial" agreement does not make a contract,
the trial court's finding with respect to "extras"
must be based on an explicit agreement between the
parties after October 15.

The record shows no such

agreement,
(1) The Language and Intent of the October
15 Agreement Shows that the Parties Were Referring
Back to the July 11 Proposal to Define Its Scope and
Meaning.
Mr. Stangl's July 11 letter and cost breakdown sheet is attached to the construction agreement
itself as Exhibit "C". The agreement recites that
"Contractor has prepared the contract price based
upon preliminary plans and specifications prepared by
Ronald Molen, AIA."

(emphasis added)

Mr. Stangl

testified that he prepared the July estimate from a
preliminary set of plans dated May 6, 1972 (R. 549).
The agreement recites further that "the letter
attached hereto as Exhibit C with its attached cost
breakdown, sets forth types of materials to be specified in the final plans and working drawings . . . ."
Nowhere in the contract is any reference made to more
complete plans or specifications.

There is certainly

no language in the agreement adopting or incorporating
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any plans or specifications prepared after the July
proposal, irrespective of whatever work the architect
may have performed in the intervening period.

It is

clear, too, that the agreement contemplates future
preparation of plans and specifications.
Section 2.2 of the agreement imposes on the
parties the duty to work together to prepare the
final plans and specifications, an act which was to
occur in the future, clearly requiring future agreement between the parties.

See Nave v. McGrane, supra.

There is no testimony in the record that
the parties ever discussed or considered the state of
the plans at the time the October agreement was executed.
Even though the court's ruling gives special
weight and importance to the plans purportedly in
existence on October 15, the agreement itself does not.
In Article IX, it provides that the plans are to be
given lowest priority in resolving any conflict among
the contract documents.

The construction agreement,

the General Conditions and the Supplementary General
Conditions, respectively, were given precedence.

This

undoubtedly reflected the parties' recognition that
the plans upon which the October agreement were based
at the time of its execution were not definite nor
complete enough to provide a firm foundation for resolution of disputes.
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(2) The Record Shows That the Plans and
Specifications Were Incomplete and Uncertain on
October 15,
In a colloquy between defendants' counsel
and the trial bench, defendants1 theory as to the
plans and specifications as of the date of the
October 15 agreement is evident:
"MR. TANNER: . . .[T]he theory upon which
I have approached the analysis of these items
is that if it's in the drawings by October 15,
[it is] part of the contract.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TANNER: Okay. Now, the November 3
is the closest we can come to that. So, that
little gap, I contend is their problem,
because they are the ones who are required
to be certain as a scrivener. Except for that
little gap, which Mr. Money says, you know, I
think it's five percent of his total work,
but in that gap there are some changes and no
one can tell exactly which they are. So I
am contending that by referring to the November
3 we are entitled to an assumption that it
is substantially the same as October 15."
(R. 1517)
Not only does this theory ignore the construction
agreement, which was based on the July proposal, but
counsel's statement concedes that it is virtually
impossible to identify the plans and specifications
in existence as of October 15.
Eleven sets of plans were admitted into
evidence at trial. Five of these sets showed the
various stages of development of the working drawings
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on t h e p r o j e c t . " . /

These f i v e s e t s can be summarized

as follows:
Exhibit
• ' 'No.

Sheets

Contents
Shown
• i"i

Date

• • '\

1.

101-D

17

Layout, floor plans,
elevations

Undated prior
to November 3,
1972 (R. 998)

2.

78-D

35

Layout, floor plans,
elevations, structural, parking ramps
and specification
sheet

November 3,
1972

3.

8-D

37

Layout, floor plans,
elevations, structural, ramps, two
sheets of mechanical
and a specifications
sheet

November 21,
1972

9-0

71

Complete set - all
mechanical foundations, floor plans,
parking ramps,
mechanical, including written specifications (Ex. 10-D)

About
February 6,
1973 (Final
Specifications ware
not prepared
until this
date.)

77-D

10

Parking ramp

Undated

5.

There are no plans which can definitely be
said to have been in existence on October 15.

All

that can be said is that the November 3 plans and the

z/oE the others, one set (Ex, 75^P) consisted of plans
from an unrelated project used by plaintiff as an aid in preparing
his original cost estimate (Ex. 11-D) for Dr. Todd. Four sets
(Ex. 74-D, 6-D, 7-D and 7HD(a)), are all preliminary sketches,
showing little or no detail. 74-D, which is essentially identical
to 7-D and 7-D(a), was actually used by plaintiff in preparing
his July cost estimate. 100-D reflects the work done by the
engineer in September of 1972 in analyzing alternative floor structures for the project. 102-D and 103-D, one a sepia and one a
vellum, are one page drawings of floor plans and represent sheets
incorporated in more complete sets.
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undated plans marked 101-D are those whose existence
must closely approximate the October 15 date.

Since

the undated plans (101-D) were prepared first (R. 950),
they must either be closer to the October 15 date or
have actually been in existence at that time.
Cursory physical observation reveals important differences between those two sets of plans. The
November 3 plans are nearly twice as large, containing
34 sheets, as compared to the undated plans, containing
17 sheets. The former contains 4 sheets of foundation
drawings, 7 sheets of parking ramp plans, 14 interior
elevations, a door schedule, and a window schedule.
The latter (Ex. 101-D) includes none of these except
for the interior elevations, of which there are 9.
Many of the changes are significant.

For example, on

the first page of the November 3 plans, the east sideyard has been changed from 25 feet to 44 feet 8 inches,
and the lobby area is 10 feet shorter.

A retaining

wall, a garbage area, parking barriers, a redwood
fence, a brick wall around the sundeck, a driveway on
the east end, and fire hydrants have all been added.
The interior plans showed that a hallway at the east
end of the corridor on the first floor of the east
tower has been removed.

In the B units, the bathrooms

throughout have been revised, additional drywall is
shown, 3 feet of cabinets are added, and wooden grills
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are included in the November 3, but not in the
earlier, plans.
These two sets of plans were prepared
principally by Mr. Robert Money, Molen B s draftsman,
who was primarily responsible for the actual drafting.

Mr. Money did not know the status of the plans

as of October 15 (R. 1003),

He did remember that

there were, as the plans themselves reflect, changes
in and additions to the drawings between October 15
and November 3 (R. 1005).1/

Mr. Money was examined

at some length about the items included between
October 15 and November 3.

With very few exceptions,

he stated that he did not know when the changes were
made (R. 1002-1019).
After November 3, the plans themselves show
continuous development.

The court ruled that Exhibit

9, the final February plans and specifications,
reflects the agreement "contemplated by the parties
as of October 15" (Finding No. 5, R. 1575).

There

were many changes in the drawings between October 15
and the final February plans.

These changes, more

Mr. Money's work records indicate that betwaen
October 15 and November 3 he spent approximately 88 hours on
the Canyon Road project. (Ex. 96-D) Of this time Money felt
that about 24 hours were devoted to "cleaning up" the November
3 plans. The remaining 64 hours were devoted to the drawings
the plans contained. (Ex. 78-D)
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relevant to the subject of the claimed "extras",
are discussed in the next section of this brief.
Again, the physical nature of the plans themselves
show how insubstantial the agreement on plans really
was on October 15. The February plans contain 70
sheets, compared to the undated plans5 17 sheets
(Ex. 101-D), and the November 3 plans1 34 sheets.
The February plans are complete and contain all of
th€> mechanical, electrical and other subcontractor
shop drawings which are found only fragmentarily or
not at all in both the November 3 and the earlier
plans.
The continuing development of the plans is
corroborated by correspondence between Ray Stoddard,
Sherwood and Roberts1 manager, and National Life
Insurance, the lender on the project.

On October 9,

in a letter to the company covering two sheets of
floor plans, Stoddard states that, although the architects "are doing pretty good", many of the sheets are
incomplete (Ex. 89-D).

On October 16, Stoddard

informed the company that the plans should be done
in about two weeks (Ex. 90-D).

On November 1, he

said that the floor plans were being revised (Ex.
92-D).

On November 21, Stoddard sent additional plans

to the company, reciting again that the drawings were
not complete (Ex. 93-D).

As late as November 28,
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1972,"Mr. Curreri of the insurance company wrote to
Stoddard thanking him for "the partially completed
working drawings" (Ex. 94-D).

Dr. Todd testified

that on or about January 31, 1973, he received an
irate letter from the insurance company stating that
they were tired of the delay and demanding that the
plans be completed forthwith (R. 43 0).
The trial court found something that did
not exist—namely, that the plans and specifications
were sufficiently complete as of October 15 to "substantially reflect" the "substantial" agreement of
the parties (Finding No. 4, R. 1575).
(3) There Was No Agreement Concerning
"Extras".
Article III of the construction agreement
provides:
"Section 3.1 The Owner may from time to
time, by written instructions signed by the
Owner's Representative, issued to the Contractor,
order work changes in the nature of additions,
deletions or modifications, without invalidating
the Contract, and agrees to make corresponding
adjustments in the contract price and time of
termination. All changes will be authorized by
a written change order signed by the Owner's
Representative. The change order will include
conforming changes in the Contract and termination time.
Work shall be changed, and the contract
price and termination time shall be modified
only as set out in the written change order.
Any adjustment in the Contract sum resulting
in a credit or a charge to the Owner shall be
determined by mutual agreement of the parties,
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before starting the Work involved in the
change. Further, Owner shall pay to the
Contractor at the time of any change order
thirty percent (30%) of the cost of said
change if the change increased the cost of
the project. . . . " (emphasis added)
This provision established the sole procedure for ordering extra work or materials through
written change orders to be signed by the architect.
At the time of the change order, defendants were
required to pay the contractor 30 percent of any
mutually agreed increase in cost resulting from the
change.

The obvious purposes of this provision were

to specify the exact nature and cost of changes and
to prevent misunderstanding or dispute about what
it€>ms were to be part of the contract and what items
were in fact to be extras.

The record shows that

the* procedures of Article III were never used; no
chcinge orders were ever issued by the architect; no
increased costs were ever agreed upon, no such orders
were ever sent to plaintiff, and plaintiff was, of
course, never paid or tendered 30 percent of such
increased costs.

In fact, as has been shown,

defendants refused to pay anything more than the
original contract price.
The record shows that the parties could
never agree on a contract price.

However, not only

was there no agreement about the price of the "extras",
but in fact there was no agreement about what items
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were to be included as "extras"•

Only toward the

end of the trial, when defendants realized the impossibility of showing a definite contract between the
parties based only on the October agreement, did
they strongly assert the theory of "extras".
None of the "agreed" or "specified" "extras"
found by the trial court originate from an agreement
between the parties.

Dr. Todd testified that two of

these items were discussed with Mr. Stangl—that is,
the extra bathrooms and the laundry and storage areas
(R. 409). Apart from the vague understanding that
the two items would be included in the project, the
parties never reached any agreement about their
cost.
Another group of "extras" not agreed upon
by the parties consisted of items which Dr. Todd
"understood" or "considered" as "extras". These are
the larger swimming pool (R. 1354), the larger sauna
(R. 1361), and the high-speed elevator (R. 1361)•
With respect to these three items, it is clear that
nothing like an agreement was ever reached, either as
to price or as to their inclusion as "extras" in the
project.

Dr. Todd's testimony with respect to the

elevators is typical:
"Q, Then with respect to the elevators,
.,.•.,-.•; the matter of the elevators had not been precisely fixed, had it?
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A,

No, it hadn't.

Q. So there is a figure in the first bid
or price of Mr. Stangl of $95,000 for the elevator. And the most he ever set down as being
charged for an elevator is $109,600. So that
the $14,600 difference could appropriately be
considered an extra, could it?
A. I suppose so. I didn't think we had
much voice in picking the elevators. We were
leaving that up to him and the architect."
(R. 1361).
A third group of "extras" arises from an
analysis of the plans rather than from any consideration by the parties themselves.

This category includes

a double brick expansion wall (R. 1429), a brick wall
(R. 1430), footing and foundations in the pool area
(R. 1431-32), Atlas brick in the ramps (R. 1432),
Soldier brick in the ramp (R. 1436), additional steel
in the ramp area (R. 1436), extra fire hydrants
(R. 1438), and built-in furniture (R. 1438).

With

these items, there is not even a pretense of an understanding or agreement as is demonstrated by the fact
that the items and their costs could only be established as "extras" by an expert witness called upon
at trial to speculate as to what the parties had agreed
and at what price.
The court, without any evidence of assent
by the parties created an agreement about the "extras"
when in fact no agreement existed.

The court's

ruling with respect to "extras" in itself points out
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the lack of definiteness and certainty in the purported contract.-^

Clearly Mr. Stangl could never

have performed without an agreement concerning these
"extras" and equally as clearly no agreement was ever
reached.

Finally, as noted, defendants were unable

to pay for any "extras" because they had no money
above the original $2,399,222.
POINT II
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE APARTMENT
COMPLEX, RATHER THAN THE COST TO COMPLETE I T , I S THE
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN THIS CASE.
Assuming t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t

in

f i n d i n g a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d a b r e a c h by
plaintiff,

the court nevertheless erred in i t s

m i n a t i o n of damages.

deter-

T h e s e damages w e r e m e a s u r e d by

determining t h a t t h e c o s t t o complete t h e p r o j e c t
have been $ 2 , 9 7 0 , 4 0 0 .

would

The c o u r t t h e n s u b t r a c t e d t h e

c o n t r a c t p r i c e , t h e c o s t of t h e " e x t r a " i t e m s , and

~ / The t r i a l court did not use i t s t h e o r i e s of
t h e agreement c o n s i s t e n t l y . For example, the November 3 plans
c l e a r l y show i n t e r i o r walls of concrete block (Ex. 78-D,
sheet 4 ) . Later t h e i n t e r i o r walls were changed t o 8 inch
Atlas brick (Ex. 8-D, sheet 4 ) . After t h a t , t h e 8 inch brick
was changed t o 6 inch Atlas brick, and t h i s material appears
in t h e f i n a l February plans (Ex. 9-D). Clearly t h i s item
should have been included a s an "extra" but was n o t . Another
example i s t h e wooden g r i l l s i n the B u n i t s . This item
again did not appear i n the November 3 p l a n s , but was included
i n t h e February p l a n s . I t was not allowed a s an "extra" even
though Dr. Todd t e s t i f i e d t h a t he "understood" i t t o be one
(R. 1357).
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the value of the work performed by plaintiff, from
this cost of completion.

This measure of damages

awarded defendants a substantial windfall because
the project, if completed, would not have had a fair
market value equal to the cost of completion figure
adopted by the court.

In addition, this measure of

damages penalized the plaintiff because defendants
were awarded an amount equal to plaintiff's projected
loss, rather than equal to the benefit of their bargain.
After it became clear that the parties could
not agree, Drs. Todd and Lignell abandoned all plans
to erect the contemplated apartment complex.

The *

work Stangl had already performed was demolished, and
work was commenced on a new and completely different
project, comprising condominium units, by a different
contractor.

Dr. Todd explained that to complete the

apartment complex at bid prices received would be
economically unfeasible:
"BY MR. TANNER:

:

Q. Dr. Burton (sic), did you go forward
after giving notice, that is the letter from
my office demanding that Mr. Stangl go ahead
and build it the way you claim he contracted
to build the apartments, did you thereafter go
forward and build this twin tower apartment
house?
A.

No, we didn't.

Q.

And why not?
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A. Well, there were several reasons.
Number one, we didn't have the additional
money to build it. And on the basis of the
rental projections which had been made, and
which we felt were maximum, it would have
been uneconomical to expend a greater sum on
it. It would have been an invitation to
economic disaster.
* * *

Q. (By Mr. Tanner) Did you make efforts
to ascertain whether you could supplement the
money and property which you had by borrowed
funds, and in that fashion, achieve enough
money to go ahead and actually build the project even though the cost of it may be as
projected?
A. We did make inquiries as to whether
more money was available.
Q.

Was there money available?

A.

No, it wasnft."(R. 481)(emphasis added)

This is not a case of construction abandoned
when substantial work had already been performed on
the structure.

The little work that had been completed

was demolished after the events that the trial court
later ruled constituted a breach on Stangl's part.
The defendants were not put in a position where they
were compelled to expend additional sums to finish a
substantially completed project.

It is apparent

from defendants1 own testimony that the project was
barely feasible at the price of the original agreement,
let alone at any higher price.

And the apartment com-

plex was obviously planned for income purposes, without
any "personal" importance or value to the owners.
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In these circumstances, fundamental principles of damages for breach of contract and the
better considered opinions require that damages be
measured by the fair market value of the proposed
apartment complex, not the hypothetical cost to
complete it.
A.

The Case Law Is Clear that Cost of Com-

pletion Is an Improper Measure of Damages When the
Owners Abandon All Plans to Complete the Improvement.
The question before this Court is considered
in American Surety Co. v. Woods, 105 F. 741 (5th Cir.
1901), aff'd on reh'g, 106 F. 263 (1901).

Plaintiff,

a receiver for a sewer company, brought suit against
the contractor's bonding company after the contractor,
claiming he had been excused from his contractual
obligations, refused to finish the work.

After the

repudiation, the sewer company made no attempt to complete the work; and as the facts were presented to the
appellate court it was clear the project had been
finally and totally abandoned.

The Court stated that:

"The question to be considered is the
charge of the court on the measure of damages.
The instruction, in effect, was that the
measure of damages was the difference between
the contract price and what it would have >
cost to finish the sewers, and that, to recover this difference, it was not necessary
for the sewerage company to complete the work."
(105 F. at 743)
The Court held that this instruction was error, stating:
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. . . whatever other damages may have
been sustained, it cannot be said, before
the work has been completed at a greater
cost, that the injured party has sustained
damages to the amount of the difference
between the contract price and the cost of
completing the work. In the absence of legal
defense the employer can, of course,
recover damages for a breach of the contract
of employment by the employe. Where the
employe or contractor without legal cause
abandons the work, unfinished, the right of
the employer to sue for the breach of the
contract is not dependent upon his completing
the abandoned work. He may sue at once and
recover of the employe or contractor such
damages as under legal rules he can show he
has sustained. But when the employer does
not incur the expense of completing the
abandoned work, and determines not to finish
it, the sum that the contractor would have
Tost had he complied with the agreement and
finished the work, or the difference between
the contract price and the cost of completion
cannot be taken as the measure of damages."
(105 F. at 746) (emphasis supplied)
In considering an old New York case, Kidd v.
McCormick, 83 N.Y. 391, the Fifth Circuit, in American
Surety, said:
"It will be observed that the [New York]
court states that 'his damage is the difference between the value of the house furnished
and the house as it ought to have been furnished. 8 It is not held that the measure of
"•'x- damages is the difference between the contract
price and what it would have cost to finish
the house." (105 F. at 747) (emphasis supplied)
American Surety is obviously very similar to
the instant case.

There as here the injured owner

abandoned all plans and determined not to finish the
work.

There as here he relied entirely on a claim that

cost of completion is the proper measure of damages.
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In Nello L. Teer Co, v. Hollywood Golf
Estates, Inc., 324 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964), American Surety was
reaffirmed.

In Teer, judgment was entered on the

defendant owner's counterclaim against the contractor
for breach of a contract for dredging and landfill.
The finding of a breach was affirmed, but the damage
award, based on cost of completion, was reversed for
want of any evidence in the record that the owner had
completed or intended to do so.

The court stated:

"A fairly early decision by this Court,
American Surety Co. v. Woods, 5th Cir.,
105 F. 741 (1901), never overruled or criticized, as far as we have ascertained,
squarely held that where a construction or
similar contract is breached by a contractor
after partial performance, the contractee is
not entitled automatically to recover the
difference between the contract price and
the amount which it would have cost to have
the work done, unless completion actually is
accomplished at a greater cost. While this
case involved a Louisiana statute, the
Court made it plain that the common law was
to the same effect. . . .
"We conclude, therefore, that the judgment of the District Court on the question
of quantum of damages must be reversed, and
the case remanded for a new trial on that
aspect. Of course, Teer is entitled to
credit for the work it actually performed."
(324 F.2d at 672-73)
These two seem to be the only cases that
have squarely considered the issue presented here:
Is cost of completion the proper measure of damages
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when the owner abandons all plans to complete the
work?

Both concluded that it was not.
Defendants contended in the trial court

that American Surety has been impugned in the Fifth
Circuit by Wills v. Peace Creek Drainage Dist.,
4 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1925).

There the contractor

abandoned work on ditches for the drainage district
and contended on appeal that the work must actually
be completed before damages based on cost of completion could be awarded.

American Surety was distin-

guished by the finding that:
"The contract contains no provision for
the completion by the drainage district of
the work upon the abandonment of it by the
contractors. . . . [Tjhere was no evidence inconsistent with an intention on the part of
the drainage district ultimately to complete
the plan of reclamation provided for in the
contract." (4 F.2d at 519)
The case at hand is itself distinguishable from Wills
in that defendants have clearly and irrevocably
abandoned all intention of finishing the project.
More important, the trial court in the instant case
appears to have ignored Section 10.2 of the construction agreement (Ex. 1-P):
". . .[W]hen the Contractor defaults in
performance . . . the owner may take possession of the work site . . . and finish the
work in whatever way he deems expedient . . • ."
This provision is indistinguishable from the contract
provisions considered in American Surety which were
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found absent from the contract before the Wills court.
Nevertheless, the trial court in the instant case said
in its ruling from the bench:
"THE COURT: . . . The American Surety
. case, and I think Mr. Tanner's brief distinguished that, and I read it, contained a
provision whereby his remedy in the event
of breach was to take over and complete it.
There is no such provision in this contract."
(R. 1507)
In sum, the cases that have squarely considered the issue of whether an injured owner may
recover damages based upon cost of completion after he
has totally and irrevocably abandoned the work and
decided not to complete, have ruled that he cannot.
B.

The Award of Damages by the Trial Court,

Based Upon Cost of Completion, Constitutes Economic
Waste, Awards Defendants a Windfall and Penalizes the
Contractor.
Section 346 of the Restatement of Contracts
considers the alternatives available to an injured
owner upon a contractor's breach:
"(1) For a breach by one who has contracted
to construct a specified product, the other
party can get judgment for compensatory
damages for all unavoidable harm that the
builder had reason to foresee when the contract was made, less such part of the contract price as has not been paid and is not
still payable, determined as follows:
(a) For defective or unfinished construction
he can get judgment for either
(i) the reasonable cost of construction
and completion in accordance with the
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contract, if this is possible and does
not involve unreasonable economic waste;
or
(ii) the difference between the value
that the product contracted for would
have had and the value of the performance that has been received by the
plaintiff, if construction and completion in accordance with the contract
would involve unreasonable economic
waste." (emphasis added)
This section of the Restatement has often been cited
in Utah,

See, for example, Rex T. Fuhriman, Inc. v.

Jarrell, 21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1968); and
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d
197 (1969).
Neither Section 34 6 of the Restatement, the
comments or illustrations following it, nor any cases
construing it, explicitly indicate the measure of damages to be applied in the situation before this Court,
where the owners have abandoned their plans to complete
after an insubstantial portion of the work is performed.
However, the emphasized portions of Section 346 as set
out above, concerning limitations on the cost of completion measure when its application would involve "economic
waste", are applicable here.
Comment on Subsection (1)(a) of Section 346,
Restatementf states in part:
"In very many cases it makes little
difference whether the measure of recovery is
based upon the value of the promised product
as a whole or upon the cost of procuring or
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constructing it piecemeal. There are numerous
cases, however, in which the value of the
finished product is much less than the cost of
producing it after the breach has occurred.
Sometimes defects in a completed structure cannot be physically remedied without tearing down
and rebuilding, at a cost that would be imprudent and unreasonable. The law does not require
damages to be measured by a method requiring
such economic waste. If no waste is involved,
the cost of remedying the defect is the amount
awarded as compensation for failure to render
the promised performance." (emphasis added)
As this comment and illustration to
Subsection (1) of Section 346 indicates, "economic
waste" is most commonly thought to consist "of the
destruction of a substantially completed building
or other structure".

Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal

Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112 (Okla. 1962).

However,

the notion of economic waste cannot be rationally
restricted to situations where the undoing and redoing of work already completed is necessary.

The

concept of economic waste by itself is somewhat
imprecise with respect to what courts are attempting
to accomplish by awards of damages to injured property owners.

Professor Farnsworth, in "Legal

Remedies for Breach of Contract,"

70 Col. L. Rev.

1145 (1970), states that since courts have no
control over whether a damaged party will "waste his
awarded damages, such "waste" may occur regardless
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:

of t h e measure of damages.2/

The concept of "waste 18

r e a l l y r e v o l v e s around w h e t h e r , under t h e a p p l i c a b l e
c o n t r a c t , an a s s e t would have been produced w i t h a
v a l u e s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s t h a n t h e v a l u e of t h e a s s e t s
used t o produce i t .

P r o f e s s o r Farnsworth sums up h i s

d i s c u s s i o n as f o l l o w s :
"Much of t h e t a l k of 'economic w a s t e 1
t h u s m i s s e s t h e mark. U s u a l l y t h e only v a l i d
p o i n t t o be made i s t h a t t h e r e i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of an e x c e s s i v e w i n d f a l l for t h e owner
and a heavy p e n a l t y for t h e b u i l d e r i f c o s t
t o complete r a t h e r t h a n d i m i n u t i o n i n market i
p r i c e i s adopted a s a measure of l o s s i n v a l u e . "
(70 Col. L. Rev. a t 1174) (emphasis added)

2/ "It i s misleading, however, to suggest that
the award of damages measured by cost to complete
would result in 'economic waste' in such a situation
[as demolishing a house to i n s t a l l a different
brand
8
of pipe] . What i s meant by 'economic waste seems
rather to be a use of assets in a way considered
'wasteful' according t o standards shared by the
society in general. Certainly there would have been
'economic waste' in t h i s sense if the contractor in
Jacob & Young [v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921)] had
been compelled to replace the Cohoes pipe with Reading
a t a cost generally in excess of what society in
general, as evidenced by the market, would regard as
the resulting increase in value. But awarding damages
measured by cost to complete results in no such compulsion, for the law does not supervise the injured
party's disposition of the money that he recovers as
substitutional relief. If he recovers a sum measured
by cost to complete, he i s free to choose whether he
will 'waste i t ' on completion or put i t to other use.
Even if he will limit i t to a lesser sum ireasured by
diminution of market price, he will s t i l l be free to
waste i t along with other assets, on completion, and
i t i s doubtful that recovery of the larger sum will
appreciably increase the likelihood that he will do so.
. . ."(70 Col. L. Rev. at 1173-74) (emphasis in original;
footnotes omitted)
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Defendants in this case failed to meet their
burden of proving that the fair market value of the
apartment complex, as contemplated, would have equalled
or exceeded the original contract price.

To the extent

that the cost to complete exceeded the fair market
value of the completed project, the damages awarded
defendants were a windfall to the defendants in that
amount.

Suppose, for example, the contract price is

$1,000, the market value of the finished improvement is
$1,100, and the cost to complete the improvement is
$1,200.

If the contract is performed, the owner would

be benefited by $100 (market value minus contract price).
The contractor would have lost $200 (cost to complete
minus contract price).

But if the contractor breaches

and the owner abandons all plans to complete construction, it makes no sense to award the owner the contractor's
losses.—'

If the contract were performed he would be

benefited by only $100, not $200.

The additional $100

would be nothing more than a windfall to him and a

Clearly such an award violates:
"the general principle which underlies the ascertainment of damages for breach of contract: that the nonbreaching party should receive an award which will
put him in as good a position as he would have been
in had there been no breach." Keller v. Deseret
Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 3, 455 P.2d 197 (1969)
(emphasis added); also, Fleming v. Scott, 348 P.2d
701 (Colo. 1960).
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penalty to the contractor.

The law countenances

neither.
If Mr. Stangl had terminated construction
after substantial work had been performed on the
apartment complex, leaving the defendants with no
choice but to complete, then this "windfall" objection to cost of completion damages would be obviated.
The difference between the market value and cost of
completion would be a proximate and foreseeable result
of the breach, the cost of which Mr. Stangl could
justly be made to bear.

But as the matter stands

under the trial court's award, Stangl is required to
compensate the defendants for a loss they failed to
prove and to make them whole for gains they never
proved they would have realized had the contract been
performed,

Stangl is in effect "subsidizing" a

losing project.

As Professor Farnsworth points out,

such a result is questionable enough when the project
is completed; it is unconscionable when the project
is abandoned.
C.

The Record and Findings Contain No

Evidence of a Willful Breach as Distinguished From a
Good Faith Disagreement as to the Plaintiff's Obligations Under the Contract,
i

• •!

••

•

•

'•

'

•

-

•

*

•

"Willful" or "bad faith" breaches have often
been the basis for a cost of completion measure of
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,

damages, even if the damages have punitive or exemplary qualities.

See, e.g., V. C. Edwards Contracting

Co., Inc. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash. 2d 7, 514 P.2d
1381 (1973); and Shell v. Schmidt, 164 Cal. App. 2d
350, 330 P.2d 817, 76 A.L.R. 2d 792 (1958).
The record in this case shows that the dispute between Stangl and the doctors concerning the
terms and conditions of their agreement was in good
faith.

The contract between them was never clearly

defined.

Protracted negotiations were held between

the parties before it was decided that Mr. Stangl
would not recommence the work.

Thus, the record affords

no basis for a finding of "willfulness" or "bad faith"
on plaintiff's part, and the trial court made no such
finding.
Even when the breach is willful or in bad
faith, there are cases going both ways.

In Groves v.

John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939),
the owner leased a 24-acre tract of property to the
contractor with the right to excavate.

The lease

price was $105,000, and the lessee agreed to leave the
property with an even grade upon completion of its
excavation.

The contractor left the grade uneven and

the evidence at trial showed that to do the necessary
grading to even it up would cost $60,000, whereas the
fair market value of the property with an even grade
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was $12,160. The trial court awarded the latter
sum.

The appellate court reversed awarding damages

of $60,000. The reversal was based in part on the
willful breach.
•

In an Oklahoma case, Peevyhouse v. Garland

Coal Mining Co., supra, the owners of a farm leased
it for strip mining purposes with the stipulation in
the lease agreement that the land would be restored
to its original contours upon completion.

Again, the

contractor abandoned the land without restoring it to
its original contours.

The evidence at trial showed

that the fair market value of the farm with even contours was $300 while the cost of completing the work
would be $29,000. The trial court awarded damages of
$5,000, which on appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reduced to $3 00.
Each of these almost identical cases arrived
at the opposite result with respect to the proper
measure of damages. A fair inference would be that
the contractor in Peevyhouse, assessing his cost to
complete the work against the damages that the owner
might incur, made a more or less "willful" choice to
breach the contract.—'

Thus, Peevyhouse presented a

— ' The Peevyhouse majority seems to have ignored
the owners1 arguments that bad faith was involved, although the
dissenters in that case thought it was.
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much stronger case for awarding cost of completion
than the instant case.

Nevertheless, the Court

refused to use this measure of damages.
D.

The Apartment Complex Was Income Prop-

erty, and Its Value to Defendants Must Be Measured
in Terms of Its Value for Such Commercial Purposes.
Illustration 4 to Restatement of Contracts,
§ 346, states:
"A contracts to construct a monumental
fountain in B's yard for $5,000, but abandons
the work after the fountain has been laid and
$2,800 has been paid by B. The contemplated
fountain is so ugly that it would decrease
the number of possible buyers of the place.
The cost of completing the fountain would
be $4,000. B can get judgment for $1,800,
the cost of completion less the part of the
price unpaid."
In such circumstances, where the improvement
confers some special personal benefit on its owner,
cost of completion may be a fair measure of damages.
As Professor Farnsworth puts it:
"Damages measured by the diminution in
the price that Owner could realize on the
market, . . . avoid the above objection [that
Owner would obtain a windfall], but are subject to the converse objection that they may
undercompensate Owner. If Owner planned to
keep the building for his own use, the advantage that he expected may well exceed that to
those who would buy on the market. As Bonbright
pointed out,
"'many properties, highly priced for
the special purposes for which they are
designed, are of trivial value [on the
market] because only the present owner is
in a position to exploit them.1" (70 Col.
L. Rev. at 1168)
-52-

The foregoing arguments are inapplicable
in the instant case because the contemplated apartment complex was obviously income property to be
exploited for commercial purposes (R. 481). Its
value for such purposes is its fair market value, and
it conferred no other special personal value on the
defendants.
E.

A Useful Standard for Determining Whether

Cost to Complete or Diminution in Value Should Be Used
as the Measure of Damages Is Whether the Work Was
Substantially Performed.
The state of Washington is one jurisdiction
which has adopted a consistent general rule for determining whether cost of completion or diminution in value
should be the proper measure of damages upon a contractor's breach.

In Forrester v. Craddock, 317 P.2d

1077 (Wash. 1957), the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
"For the reasons stated in White v.
Mitchell, 1923, 123 Wash. 630, 213 P. 10,
13, this court has consistently followed
the principles therein announced:
»• i * * * Where the builder has substantially complied with his contract,
the measure of damages to the owner
would be what it would cost to com- .-'••'•
plete the structure as contemplated
by the contract. * * * Generally,
where there has not been such substantial performance, the measure
of the owner's damage is the difference between the value of the building as constructed and its value had
it been constructed in accordance
with the contract.'" (317 P.2d at 1082)
(emphasis added)
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The Washington court was considering a
case where "substantial performance" turn in part
upon considerations of undoing and redoing work
already performed.

The important point, however, is

that even though cost of completion may award a
windfall to the owner, it is arguable it should be
used only where completion of the project is necessary and foreseeable in order to avoid a larger
economic waste.

In our case, however, where only

1.5 percent of the cost was incurred, it cannot be
said that there was substantial performance.
Whether the end to be obtained is the prevention of "economic waste" or the prevention of unnecessary windfalls to the owners and unfair penalties to the contractor, fair market value is the
reasonable and proper standard by which the value
lost to the owner should be measured.

Defendants

failed to meet their burden of proving the fair
market value of the completed project.
CONCLUSION
The record is clear that when the parties
executed the October agreement

they had not yet

entered an enforceable construction contract.

Many

specific items of construction remained to be agreed
upon.

It is clear that with respect to these items

the parties never agreed

either upon price or upon
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what the items themselves should be. Without any
agreement on these items, the October agreement
remained vague and indefinite and the parties could
not have performed under it.

It was error for the

trial court to rule that agreement was reached as
to these additional items, or "extras", when in fact
the record is clear that no such agreement was ever
made.
Even if an enforceable construction contract
had been entered, the trial court erred by using cost
of completion as the measure of damages when the
defendant owners have no intention of ever completing
the project.

The proper measure in such circumstances

is the fair market value the apartment complex would
have had upon completion.

The measure used awards

defendants a windfall and penalizes plaintiff.

Defend-

ants failed completely in meeting their burden of
showing the fair market value of the apartment complex.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial
court should be vacated and judgment entered for the
plaintiff for the value of the work he performed.

In

the alternative, the case should be remanded for a new
trial on the issue of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD & GELDZAHLER
Frederick S. Prince, Jr.
Kenneth W. Yeates
J. Rand Hirschi
Attorneys for Appellant
-55-

